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Presentation Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the important changes in technology to occur between
the passage of the Copyright Act of 19091 and the current General
Revision Act of 19762 has been the advent of various mechanical
and electronic devices which have enabled individuals to copy
works on a large scale for their own private use. The 1909 Act was
not adequately equipped to deal with these technological changes,
resulting in a great many problems in the copyright laws of the
United States. One problem area is the copying of an entire work
for private, noncommercial use. At the time of passage of the 1909
Act, this copying process was so tedious that the drafters did not
need to deal with it with any particularity. During the drafting of
the 1976 General Revision, many of the controversies concerned
this ability of private parties to quickly, easily and inexpensively
copy an entire copyrighted work, or substantial portions thereof.
At the time of passage of the General Revision, probably the most
debated problems of private copying, as witnessed by lengthy stat-
utory provisions and corresponding legislative history,3 were those
issues involved in the various photocopying controversies. But
several other problem areas of importance involving private copy-
ing also exist. This comment will focus on questions relating to
one of these other problem areas, the relation of copyright law to
audiovisual recording and presentation systems.
These video tape recording (VTR) 4 systems are currently being
1. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat 1075 [hereinafter cited as the 1909 Act].
2. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810) [hereinafter cited as the General Revision].
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976); H. IL REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-79, re-
printed in [1976] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5678-93; S. REP. No. 473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-71 (1975).
4. The term VTR will be used in referring to those systems described in note 5
and accompanying text infra. It was chosen primarily for its popularity in
the trade magazines. The systems sell under several brand names, and other
articles refer to words and phrases such as TV cartridge, audiovisual record-
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mass produced and marketed for the private use of American con-
sumers. This has resulted in questions concerning the rights of
individuals to copy audiovisual works for their private use. Al-
though much less discussed than photocopying when Congress
drafted the General Revision, the questions associated with VTR
systems nevertheless have ramifications potentially as great.
VTR systems have certain technological differences which
make many of the brand name components incompatible with
each other,5 but despite this all contain certain common and essen-
tial characteristics which are of importance in the copyright area.
These characteristics include a component which, when connected
in some manner with an ordinary television set, allows that televi-
sion set to produce images on its screen from "software" (a tape,
disk, cassette or cartridge) inserted in the unit. In addition, the
components of major interest in the copyright area are capable of
recording programs as they are broadcast over-the-air by a televi-
sion station,6 and then preserving these recordings on the
machine's software. This software can then be replayed at the
owner's convenience, or re-recorded with a later program if de-
sired.
VTR systems are being marketed with equal vigor essentially
for three distinct consumer uses: (1) The companies are manufac-
turing and marketing pre-recorded programs, or "software" (both
the program and the tape embodying it) to accompany the VTR
systems in much the same way records and tapes currently accom-
pany the use of audio stereo systems.7 (2) The machines are being
marketed to stress the fact that the owner is able to record shows
broadcast by television stations for later viewing at the owner's
convenience. Current products on the market enable the owner to
ing and presentation systems, video cassette machines, videos, VCR, and
other related names. VTR is chosen for its acceptance and brevity, and is not
meant to diminish the important audio function of the machines.
5. Of the more than twenty brand name components on the market at the end of
1978, there currently exist at least four incompatible systems whose retail
value on the market is below $1,500. Incompatibility means that the
"software" for one manufacturer's unit (the tape, cartridge, cassette, or disk)
cannot be used in another manufacturer's unit. See Long, VCRs: A Way-of-
Life Revolution in the Making, HGH FIDELrrY, Mar. 1978, at 61-65.
6. The fact that the "videodisk" machine cannot record is the major drawback to
this particular machine, which was supposed to pioneer the field. See Com-
ment, "Disk-Television'" Some Recurring Copyright Problems in the Repro-
duction and Performance of Motion Pictures, 34 U. CHL I REV. 686 (1967);
Video Disks, The New Television, FoRBES, June 1, 1976, at 24. The first vide-
odisk machines have just been made available to the general public, and it
will sell for $695, with pre-recorded disks ranging in cost from $6-$20. See
B OTHoAD, Dec. 23, 1978, at 5.
7. The concept of stereo in video systems is considered a necessary element for
the future. Long, supra note 4, at 62.
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record a program on one channel while watching another, or, by
the use of a timer, to record a show while he or she is not at home.
(3) The makers of some of the systems are marketing compatible
compact home-movie cameras so the systems will appeal to home-
movie buffs.8 These first two functions result in potential conflicts
with the copyright laws, and will be the major concern of this com-
ment.
That VTR systems are going to be a way of life for many Ameri-
cans is a fact which few observers in the area dispute.9 Just how
far VTR systems will go in changing the motion picture, recording
and television industries, and in turn the American lifestyle itself,
is only speculation at this point, but the possibilities appear almost
limitless. 10
8. For the marketing strategies of VTR manufacturers, see various articles in
BILLBOARD, Mar. 11, 1978 at 1, 52.
9. This was the general consensus of the 1978 convention of the International
Tape Association. For several articles on different aspects of the industry dis-
cussed at the convention, see BusBoARD, Mar. 11, 1978, Mar. 18, 1978, and Mar.
24, 1978. The articles also stated that the manufacturers expect to have sold
500,000 units by the end of 1978. Later figures showed that 375,432 units were
sold during the period from January to September, 1978, compared to 115,411
units during the same period in 1977, an increase of over 225%. BTILBoARD,
Dec. 9, 1978, at 58. Video software sales increased 70% during the same pe-
riod. Id.
10. See, e.g., Video Disks, the New Television, FORBEs, June 1, 1976, at 24; Fong-
Torres, Freedom of Video: The Battle Begins at Home, ROLLING SToNE, Sept.
8, 1977, at 61. Viewers may well purchase audiovisual software to experience
their favorite pop idol or symphonic orchestra with two senses rather than
only one. This appears very likely to become a reality if the software can be
brought down to the projected price of ten dollars for a traditional length "al-
bum." Likewise, motion pictures, which are currently available for commer-
cial sale on videotape only after their theater and television marketability
have dropped, may some day be marketed in record and tape stores, or video
"lending libraries" on a lease basis, greatly damaging or at least changing
both the movie theater industry and the profitability of movies broadcast on
television. Such a comprehensive video library has been set up in the United
Kingdom, offering full length feature films, and features on subjects such as
music, angling and chess. The software is available for sale or rental, the two
day rental fee being $11. BruixoARD, Dec. 2, 1978, at 62. It is still too early to
determine if the use of VTR systems will become so widespread that new
release movies, like best sellers in the book industry and the top forty in the
record industry, will be totally dependent upon retail sale or lease for their
profits. Such an eventuality would appear more likely if it were not for the
fact that the movie theater and television industries have been reluctant to
accept this possibility. See generally Harmetz, The Magic of Hollywood at
Home-$50 per Video Cassette, The Washington Star, Mar. 2, 1978, at D-3, coL
1.
Furthermore, the television industry faces the immediate problem of loss
in value of programs it wishes to reshow, which of course is current industry
practice. Those who wish to watch a program again, or who missed the pro-
gram, will have recorded it and will watch it again at their leisure, rather than
waiting for the network to reschedule it at some unknown future time. This
in turn will affect the advertisers of such programs, who will be unwilling to
1979]
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Many of the copyright problems presented by this relatively
new industry are as speculative as the economic problems.'
There has been very little case law in this area, and the General
Revision has been accused of creating as many questions as it an-
swers,12 but it does solve many of the problems of the 1909 Act sim-
ply by recognizing the existence and copyrightability of audio-
visual works. This is not to imply that these works were not pro-
tected prior to the General Revision, but the 1909 Act was often
unclear or silent in this area. The major portion of this comment
will concern itself with the copyright implications of private home
use of the VTR. This discussion of the effect of the copyright law
on VTR systems is not intended to detail their use by institutions
in an educational setting, their use by or possible use in libraries,
or use by taverns, hotels, clubs and other "semi-public" users. The
provisions of the General Revision dealing with public, cable, or
pay television systems are not within the scope of this discussion
except as they directly relate to the VTR system as defined. 13
II. THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AFFORDED
AUDIOVISUAL WORKS USED IN VTR SYSTEMS
Before any decision can be made regarding possible copyright
infringements by the use of VTR systems, the initial issue to be
determined is whether video works are protected under the Ameri-
can copyright laws. In addition, if they are copyrightable, the ex-
tent of the rights a copyright owner has must be examined. While
a discussion of the copyrightability of VTR software may seem aca-
demic, unfortunately it is not. There was a great deal written
about whether copyright protection extended to such works under
the 1909 Act. It will be helpful to briefly recount that controversy
maintain their current television advertising budgets if they suspect the
viewers are watching a recorded program or movie during prime time view-
ing. Additionally, these systems are capable of recording the programs and
leaving out the commercials, or they contain fast forward features which run
through the advertisements, further reducing the sponsors' willingness to
pay the current large sums spent on television advertising. It has also been
noted that most television shows today count on their rerun capabilities to
make a profit. Fong-Torres, supra, at 60.
11. See note 10 supra.
12. BmLOARD, Mar. 24, 1978, at 134.
13. It has been noted that VTR systems have a competitive advantage over Pay-
TV and cablecasting (CATV) systems in that by not involving communica-
tion by wire or radio they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). For a general discussion of how VTR
systems do relate to these other television forms, see Meyer, TV Cassettes-A




and then examine whether the 1976 General Revision resolved the
issue.
A. Protection Under the 1909 Act
The odd quirk in copyright law development in the United
States which left the copyright protection of VTR software ques-
tionable under the 1909 Act has been dealt with at length else-
where' 4 and need not be presented in great detail here. The
problem originated with a Supreme Court case decided prior to the
1909 Act, White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.15 There,
the Court held that perforated piano rolls manufactured by the de-
fendant were not "copies" and consequently did not infringe the
composer's copyright in the underlying work. This result was
reached because the rolls were "parts of a machine" which con-
veyed "no meaning ... to the eye of even an expert musician, and
they [were] wholly incapable of use save in and as a part of a
machine especially adapted .... 1 6 This reasoning served as the
basis for denying a copyright in material embodied in phonograph
records, 17 which in turn necessitated the Sound Recording Amend-
ment of 1971.18 The obvious reasoning of the White-Smith Court
was that to be a "copy" within the meaning of the statute,19 it had
to be visibly intelligible. Given only these facts it is easy to see
how a videotape could be considered not a "copy" and therefore
not copyrightable. 20 Videotape does not make the copyrighted
work intelligible to the naked eye, "save in and as a part of the
machine especially adapted." Of course motion picture film is gen-
erally recognized as visible to the naked eye and therefore does
14. See, e.g., M. Nnw4ER, NuaniER ON COPYRiGHT § 25.3, at 114 to 118.1 (1976); Hol-
land, The Audiovisual Package: Handle With Care, 22 BULT. COPYRIGHT Soc'y
104, 105-08 (1974); Nimmer, Proprietary Rights, Residual Rights, and Copy-
right in Cartridge Vin the United States and Canada, 3 PERF. ARTS. REV. 3-6
(1972); Painter, Proprietary Rights in Video Tape, 7 BEv. HniS B.J. 24 (May-
June 1973); Comment, supra note 6, at 687-93.
15. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
16. Id. at 13.
17. Of course the underlying music was still copyrightable; it was only the copy-
right in the phonorecord itself that was denied. This result had been as-
sumed by a number of courts since the adoption of the 1909 Act. See M.
NmmR, NumMER ON COPYRIGHT § 35.21 n.57 (1976) (collecting cases). And in
Capitol Records Inc. v. Mercury Records, 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955), the court
so suggested, relying on committee reports and White-Smith.
18. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140,85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15, 1972, until
Jan. 1, 1975).
19. The statute in effect at the time of White-Smith was the Act of Mar. 3,1891, ch.
565, 26 Stat. 1106.
20. It must be remembered, however, that White-Smith dealt with what was a
copy for infringement purposes, not with a copy for purposes of




not raise this problem.2 1
There were, however, several other factors which might have
made the White-Smith doctrine inapplicable to the videotape ques-
tion. First, some observers have pointed out that the legislative
intent of the 1909 Act was not to codify the White-Smith doctrine,22
and second, there are practical differences between piano rolls and
videotape.23 Moreover, the motion picture amendment to the 1909
Act, which went into effect in 1912,24 coupled with the above rea-
soning, convinced the Copyright Office to register magnetic video-
tape as a motion picture under sections 5(1) and 5(m) of the 1909
Act, beginning in 1961.25
Legislative history of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971
also shows that Congress, at that time, felt videotape was pro-
tected under the 1909 Act. The Sound Recording Amendment ex-
cluded "sounds accompanying a motion picture" under its
provisions protecting phonograph records. The Committee Re-
ports illustrated the reason for this distinction with the following
example:
[I]f there is an unauthorized reproduction of the sound portion of a copy-
righted television program fixed on videotape, a suit for copyright infringe-
ment could be sustained under section l(a) of title 17 rather than under
the provisions of this bill, and this would be true even if the television
producer had licensed the release of a commercial phonograph record in-
corporating the same sounds.
2 6
Therefore, although still not unanimous, most observers27 con-
cluded that videotape, like that used in VTR systems, had some
degree of protection under the 1909 Act.
B. Protection Under the General Revision Act of 1976
It was this cloud of confusion 28 that faced the drafters of the
General Revision. The new law goes a long way toward clarifying
many of these copyright problems as they affect the VTR systems.
21. See Rohauer v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1962); Independent Film Dis-
trib., Ltd. v. Chesapeake Indus., Inc., 250 F.2d 951, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1957); Univer-
sal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp. 162 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1947);
Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
22. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955) (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
23. See M. NIAMER, supra note 17, § 25.3, at 116-17.
24. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
25. See Colby, An Historic "First"-Copyright Office Accepts Magnetic Video
Tape for Registration, 8 BUL. CoPYRIGHT Soc'y 205 (1961).
26. H. R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1571; S. REP. No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
27. See note 14 supra.
28. See § 11-A of text supra.
[Vol. 58:467
AUDIOVISUAL RECORDERS
The first improvement concerns the subject matter of copyright
protection under the General Revision. Section 102 is much
clearer and more flexible than the 1909 Act:
a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which there can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
7) sound recordings. 2 9
The General Revision defines audiovisual works in terms which
apparently include VTR systems by providing that they are
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically in-
tended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes,
in which the works are embodied. 3 0
1. Ownership of Copyright in a Video Program
Before examining the type and degree of copyright protection
the General Revision affords the owner of a copyright in a video
program, it must be determined who owns the copyright or copy-
rights in the program. Section 201(d) (2) contains explicit statu-
tory recognition of the divisibility of copyright, that is that each of
the enumerated exclusive rights, or any subdivision of them, may
be owned separately and transferred 3 l separately. A video work
could be a 'joint work," as defined in the act,3 2 which has the legal
effect of making the various authors involved co-owners of a copy-
right, and as a result treating them similar to tenants in common.3 3
More likely, however, the professional work will be done by people
working for hire and the employer will be the sole copyright own-
er.
The video program itself will likely be a "derivative work," as
defined in the Act,3 which means there are two separate copy-
rights to keep in mind: (1) the copyright in the underlying work,
and (2) the copyright in the actual video program, which is distinct
from that in the underlying work. The copyright in the derivative
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) (emphasis added).
30. Id. § 101. "A 'device', 'machine', or-'process' is one now known or later devel-
oped." Id.
31. "Transfer of copyright ownership" is defined as any "conveyance, alienation,
or hypothecation," including assignments, mortgages, and exclusive licenses.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Sed id. § 201(a). See also H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5736-37.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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work does not extend to those copyrighted parts of the underlying
work, but only to the adaption of that work to the video program,
and the new creations accompanying that adaption.35
2. Type and Degree of Copyright Protection
It is important to note that the definitions in the General Revi-
sion of both "sound recordings" and "phonorecords" exclude "the
sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual
work."3 This is important to remember as the type and degree of
copyright protection afforded audiovisual works are examined.
Such an examination must begin with section 106 of the General
Revision, which, in conjunction with the definitions of section 101,
specifically grants any and all rights of the copyright owner.
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
section has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies of phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes and motion pictures and other audiovisual works to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes and pictoral, graphic or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly.
3 7
The first and the fourth exclusive rights provided in section 106 are
of primary importance in the VTR situation. It is important to note
that each of these enumerated rights may be subdivided, and each
right or subdivision of that right may be owned and enforced sepa-
rately.38 Therefore, the right to reproduce the copyrighted work
will be examined separately from the right to perform it publicly.
Section 501 of the General Revision provides that "anyone who vio-
lates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided
by sections 106 through 118 ... is an infringer of the copyright. '3 9
Analysis consequently turns to the possible infringements of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner in VTR software, both pre-
35. For a judicial discussion of the operation of copyright ownership in derivative
works of video programs, see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d
14, 19-22 (2d Cir. 1976).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
37. Id. § 106 (emphasis added).
38. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5674. See notes 31-35 & accompanying text supra.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
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recorded software and software individually recorded from a net-
work broadcast.4°
II. INFRINGEMENTS OF THE COPYRIGHT IN
AUDIOVISUAL WORKS BY VTRUSE
UNDER THE GENERAL REVISION
A. Infringement of the Right to Reproduce the Copyrighted Work
As will be discussed later,41 there is little doubt that a home
"performance" on a VTR system, whether recorded from a net-
work broadcast or not, does not infringe the copyright owner's
right to perform the work publicly. However, it is not clear
whether an individual has the right to reproduce a copyrighted
work from a program broadcast by a television station and re-
ceived on his or her television set, or copy someone's lawfully ob-
tained pre-recorded software, a capability which if not already
present, will surely arise in the future.
It appears obvious that such copying is, by the plain terms of
section 106(1), a violation of the copyright owner's exclusive right
to reproduce his work. But this exclusive right is limited by, or
subject to, the provisions of sections 107 through 118. Therefore, it
is an infringement only if an exception does not exist in those lat-
ter sections. The most obvious doctrine which may apply here is
that of "fair use."42
There was no fair use provision in the 1909 Act. It was a judi-
cially created doctrine, necessitated because there existed some
uses of copyrighted works which, although potential infringe-
ments, were thought by judges to be fair. It was thus an equitable
doctrine, and this concept of fair use was left intact by the General
Revision. Section 107 is a codification of the common law. The
House Report state&
[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statu-
tory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to
it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on
a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
43
To determine if VTR recording of copyrighted works for home use
is a fair use of the work, section 107 must be carefully studied. The
section provides:
40. It should be repeated that "software" is used to mean both the tape and the
copyrighted audiovisual work embodied in the tape. See text accompanying
note 4 supra.
41. See notes 87-97 & accompanying text infra (discussion of what is meant by
"public performance").
42. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
43. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5680.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies of pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use) scholarship or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par-
ticular case is fair use, the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work-
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portions used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.44
Despite the speculation of some observers, 45 it would appear
that home recording use of VTR systems is probably not a fair use
within the meaning of the statute. Aside from possible educational
uses, the purposes listed in the first paragraph of section 107 (criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, etc.) are not involved in recording
for one's own convenience. Even though these purposes are not all
inclusive, the four enumerated factors which section 107 provides
for consideration also weigh against a finding of fair use. The first
factor, the commercial nature of the work, is the only one which
does not weigh against the VTR user. And since the home re-
corder's use may not be educational, this factor would likely not be
considered to weigh heavily in the user's favor. The second factor,
the nature of the work, does not support a fair use finding because
the nature of programs broadcast by television networks is such
that the profitability of the work depends upon its successful rerun
capabilities, and the rerun capabilities of a video work are reduced
by home copying. The third factor weighs heavily against the
home recorder because an entire copyrighted work is usually
taken. While this is not to suggest that an entire work can never be
taken under the fair use doctrine, it is likely that all of the other
factors would also have to favor fair use, which is certainly not the
case here. The fourth factor has been considered the most impor-
tant,46 and in many ways can be viewed as a collection and restate-
ment of the first three factors. That "the potential market for or
44. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
45. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAw, PRINTED FOR THE HOUSE COMM1TrEE
ON THE JuDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SEss. 29-30 (House Comm. Print 1961)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS]; Taylor, Off-
the-Air Video Taping for Educational Purposes-Fair Use or Infringement, 12
A.F. JAG L. REV. 90, 94 (1970).
46. M. NnIMEp, supra note 17, § 145, at 646; Holland, supra note 14, at 123; Taylor,
supra note 7, at 97.
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value of the copyrighted work"47 will be greatly affected has al-
ready been discussed.4 8 While the overall market for the work
may not be altered greatly in fact, there can be no question that
there is potential for a great loss in value of the copyrighted work.
This resulting danger to the economic well being of the state of the
art, it can be argued, is counter-productive to a major goal of copy-
right law, that of promoting the useful arts by securing authors
financial incentives through exclusive rights. Still, it cannot be
conclusively stated that such home recording will not be found to
constitute fair use.49 Privacy interests and the fact that fair use is
an "equitable rule of reason"5 0 might make the courts allow such
use.
Assuming that home recording through VTR systems of televi-
sion network transmissions is an infringement of the copyrighted
work, there remain two other considerations: (1) there already ex-
ists widespread and growing copying by home video owners; and
(2) enforcement of the copyright law against these owners who are
recording in their own home for their private use is a virtual impos-
sibility. Nor would it be in the best interest of protecting personal
privacy to try and make an example of a few individual infringers
by imposing statutory damages in hope of curbing the practice.5 1
Therefore, a determination that home recording is an infringement
of the copyrighted work only defines the problem; it does not re-
solve it.
There are at least three fairly simplistic alternatives which
might be suggested as solutions to the problem. The first would be
to admit that private use is a violation of the law, but that the law is
totally unenforceable and leave it at that. Such a "solution,"
though very probable, is highly undesirable. Policy argues against
having statutes which are not enforced and which are frequently
violated. The second solution is simply to amend the copyright law
so that private use is not an infringement. While this would solve
the problem of enforcement, it, like the first solution, may work an
economic hardship on those who own the copyright in the work.
The third solution does not involve the world of copyright, but
rather the world of science. Television networks and others have
stated that there is a method by which they can make their broad-
casts nonrecordable by current commercial recorders by using a
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976).
48. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
49. Some observers would find such copying to be allowed by the related, idea of
a "home use" exception. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text infra.
50. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5679.
51. Nimmer, Proprietary Rights, Residual Rights, and Copyright in Cartridge TV
in the United States and Canada, 3 PERF. ARTs REV. 12 (1972).
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"blocking" device.52 While this may appear to be the answer to the
problem, given technological advancements, it is likely a system
would be developed that would be unaffected by the device. A de-
tailed discussion of this potential technological conflict will not be
attempted, since a more sound result would be to find a workable
solution in the law.53
One possible legal solution is to enforce the General Revision
by holding the manufacturer of the VTR system responsible for
the infringement committed by the consumers who purchase the
product. This is one of the ideas behind a suit54 by two movie mak-
ers, Walt Disney Productions and Universal City Studios, a subsid-
iary of MCA. They have joined together in a lawsuit against Sony
Corporation, the makers of Betamax, currently the largest selling
VTR System. 55 The suit alleges copyright infringement, unfair
competition, interference with contractual and advantageous busi-
ness relationships, and violations of the Lanham-Trademark Act of
1946.56 Both sides have expressed a willingness to exhaust their
judicial remedies in this matter,5 7 and if there is a final judicial res-
olution of these questions it will come at a time when VTR systems
are well entrenched in American life. In addition to arguing that
there is no infringement at all, Sony appears to have a strong argu-
ment that it is not the infringer, and that it should not be responsi-
ble for the actions of its consumers.58
52. Fong-Torres, supra note 10, at 61.
53. Another technological response which has been mentioned is a tape that e-
rases itself the first time it is played. This would allow the time shift conven-
ience, but not allow individuals to collect recordings into "libraries." Brill,
Will Betamax Be Busted?, ESQUIRE, June 20, 1978, at 22.
54. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., No. CV 76-3520-F (pending C.D.
Cal.).
55. Brill, supra note 53, at 19.
56. A motion to dismiss the alleged violations of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), was granted in Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The remain-
der of the case went to trial January 29, 1979, and there was no decision at the
time this comment went to print. It might be noted that many observers of
this litigation consider the MCA subsidiary, Universal City Studios, Inc., to be
participating in the suit because MCA/Phillips is launching its "videodisk"
systems, which show pre-recorded material on a disk, but are not capable of
recording. See, e.g., Marcos, MCA v. Sony, HIGH FMELrrY, April 1977, at 4. See
also note 6 supra.
57. Brill, supra note 53, at 22; Fong-Torres, supra note 10, at 61; TME, April 11,
1977, at 64.
58. An analogy can be drawn to the photocopying industry. No longer is it seri-
ously contended that Xerox, for example, should be held responsible for the
infringing use of its machines by private parties over whom it can exert little,
if any, control But see Brill, supra note 53, at 19. And, under 17 U.S.C. § 108
(1976), a library is not responsible for a patron's infringing use of a copying
machine on its premises, as long as adequate notice is given. An additional
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Before contesting inducement to infringe, however, defendants
have the opportunity to show that private recording is a fair use or
is otherwise exempt. In addition to the statutory interpretations
previously discussed, it is imperative that the case law also be ex-
amined, since fair use is a judicial creation, and the legislative his-
tory of the fair use provision states that the doctrine should be
examined on a case-by-case basis.5 9 A case which aids in this dis-
cussion is Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks,60
which differs from the Sony litigation mainly in that it arose in an
educational setting and did not involve private use. The plaintiffs
owned copyrighted films which the defendant, Board of Coopera-
tive Educational Services of Erie County, New York (BOCES),
had videotaped and distributed to schools for delayed classroom
viewing. The copying was substantial-ten thousand videotapes
were duplicated in the 1976-1977 school year alone. "Viewed solely
in-reference to the copyright law, BOCES' videotaping activities
would seem to constitute blatant violation of the plaintiffs' exclu-
sive rights to copy and perform their films,"'6 1 the court noted. But
it also said the requirements of fair use demand a balancing proc-
ess.62 BOCES naturally relied upon Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States63 to justify its massive educational copying. In Wil-
liams & Wilkins, a government research facility was permitted to
copy articles for researchers on a massive scale for scientific and
educational use. However, it appears the federal district court in
the BOCES case felt Williams & Wilkins was the outer bounds of
fair use, and that BOCES' copying, because it was substantial and
affected plaintiffs' potential market, exceeded the limits of Wil-
liams & Wilkins.64 The court then granted plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction, but noted several questions of fair use re-
mained at issue for trial on the merits.65 While the issue in this
case is easy compared to individual copying for private use, it does
argument against Sony, however, is that although it is warning purchasers of
possible copyright infringement, it is allegedly inducing consumers to in-
fringe copyrighted works in its advertising.
59. H. R. REPORT No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 5678-79.
60. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
61. Id. at 249.
62. Id.
63. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CL 1973) affid by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). In that case a publisher of medical journals sued a medical research
facility of the federal government. Defendants copied articles on a massive
scale for researchers, though normally they gave researchers only one copy
of a single article of 50 pages or less. On the basis of fair use, considering the
noncommercial use of science and education, the Court of Claims (4-3) con-
cluded there was no infringement.
64. 447 F. Supp. at 251.
65. Id. at 252.
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demonstrate that limits are being placed on the fair use doctrine
and suggests that Williams & Wilkins is as far as courts will go in
the educational use area.
The other case which may shed some light on whether vide-
otaping network broadcasts is an infringement is Walt Disney
Productions v. Alaska Television Network, Inc.66 In that case,
defendant took segments of plaintiffs television series, put them
on videotape, and then broadcast them to its viewers in Juneau,
Alaska, about a week later. The court first discounted defendant's
reliance upon Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,67
which dealt with community antenna television, and found copy-
right infringement in both the preparation of the videotapes 68 and
in the dissemination of the programs through defendant's cable
system. 69 The court did not deal with fair use, and it is unclear if it
held the recording of the shows an infringement per se, or held
that the recording coupled with the possible effects of its use was
an infringement. The decision seemed to be addressing factor four
of fair use when it stated:
While the defendants did not make the video tape available on a wide-
spread basis, the tapes were capable of being sold to any cable television
system with the proper equipment. Such a distribution could and no
doubt would, be in direct competition with the owner of the copyrighted
material contained, albeit hidden, therein.
70
Therefore, in words which if taken literally would likely mean that
all copying of videotape is an infringement, at least under the old
act, the court concluded:
The preparation of the video tapes of the copyrighted materials in-
fringed upon the rights of the copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. § 1 (d), and
the dissemination of the programs through the defendants' cable system
also constitutes an infringement. Whether or not the dissemination con-
stitutes a "performance" as the word is used in the above section is imma-
terial.7 1
Another argument has been made by the defendants in the
66. 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
67. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). This case dealt with community antenna television
(CATV). The Court found no infringement because there was a simultane-
ous transmission, and therefore, no "performance." Id. at 400-01.
68. The violation was of § 1(d) of the 1909 Act, which provided in part that the
copyright owner had the exclusive right "to make or to procure the making of
any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it
may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented,
produced, or reproduced."
69. The dissemination was found to be an infringement despite the court's mak-
ing no ruling on whether the dissemination constituted a "performance." 310
F. Supp. at 1075.




Sony litigation, and by at least one other commentator.72 This ar-
gument is that United States cbpyright law has developed another
equitable exception to copyright infringement, called the "home
use" exception. Home use is a separate doctrine from fair use, ac-
cording to those who believe such an exception exists. The re-
quirements of a home use exception are based roughly on the
following factors: (1) the copying must not be for a commercial
purpose; (2) there must exist practical impossibility or great diffi-
culty in enforcing against the infringement; (3) the home copying
by each individual, as opposed to that by the entire class of copi-
ers, must not greatly damage the copyright holder; (4) the copying
must be for personal use only. The underpinnings for a home use
exception are extremely complex and, because they have been
dealt with at length elsewhere, 73 will not be given in detail.
Whether or not there should be a home use exception is subject to
debate, but if there is such an exception, it would probably cover
the home user and recorder of television broadcasts. The negative
aspect of such an exception would be the economic effect on the
copyright holders resulting from the aggregate use by the entire
class of home copiers. Perhaps this aspect has not been given
sufficient consideration under the "home use" formula. Of greater
practical significance is the fact that no court has ever expressly
recognized such an exception,74 and there is no mention of the
"home use" exception in the General Revision. Only the legisla-
tive history of the 1971 Sound Recording Act supports a home use
exception,7 5 and it would be unlikely that the courts would find
such an exception absent a greater legislative mandate.
Even if it is assumed that courts will determine that home VTR
recording is an infringement under the General Revision, there is
another and arguably more equitable solution than those previ-
ously mentioned. This alternative is to establish a type of compul-
sory licensing system, operated in a fashion similar to others in the
copyright area. A license would automatically be given for private,
noncommercial home recording whenever a VTR system is
purchased. In exchange for this compulsory license, a royalty
72. See Comment, Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977
DuKE L. J. 1181.
73. Id.
74. Brill, supra note 53, at 19. But see Comment, supra note 72, at 1207 (student
author claims that two cases, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), and
Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824-25 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), either through dicta or implication, support the existence of a home
use exception). While Elektra Records does impliedly recognize a "home re-
cording" exception based on House Committee Reports, see notes 81-86 & ac-
companying text infra, Goldstein's dicta stressing the importance of the
commercial nature of the copying does not seem to go so far as to recognize a
"home use" exception.
75. See notes 81-86 & accompanying text infra.
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would be established and paid by the purchaser at the time of
purchase. This royalty could be collected and distributed to the
proper recipients by an association of authors and copyright own-
ers, in a manner similar to that in which the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. (BMI) operate in the musical and sound recordings field.76
The royalty rate could be adjusted over time so that the rewards
and incentives to the creators would remain commensurate with
that of the industry. This appears to be an equitable solution to
the problem, for it places the economic burden of recording on the
purchaser, who is the probable infringer, and will increase the re-
ward for the creator of the work, whose need for economic well-
being caused the concern initially. A system roughly equivalent to
the one just described has existed in West Germany since 1965, 77
and applies to both sound recordings and audiovisual systems. It
has been suggested,78 and it logically follows, that such a royalty
system should also apply to the purchase of blank tapes, in addi-
tion to the VTR system itself. This would make the system even
more equitable, placing a greater burden on those who record a
great deal, and relieving the burden on the consumer who does not
use the VTR to record but only to play lawfully obtained pre-re-
corded software.7 9 Such a push for a royalty on blank tapes is cur-
rently being made in the United Kingdom, where research results
indicate that the British tape industry is losing twenty percent of
its market to home tape recording.80
76. A commission could be established or the Copyright Royalty Tribunal used
to determine the proper royalty figure, whether it is easier to collect the roy-
alty at the retail or wholesale level, and similar technical problems. The most
difficult of these problems is that the purchaser does not report what he or
she intends to record, so the distribution system would have to be based on
viewer ratings or some other means to approximate which shows are being
recorded, and royalty distributions made accordingly.
77. Copyright Statute of the German Federal Republic, Act of Sept. 9, 1955, Arti-
cle 53(1)-(5). The law has been described as one which
specifically permits the making of "single copies of a work for per-
sonal use," and applies to visual as well as sound recordings. Remu-
neration to copyright proprietors is provided by a five percent tax on
"equipment suitable for making such reproductions," payable
through collecting societies to owners of works which, by their "na-
ture," are expected to be reproduced.
Holland, supra note 14, at 126 (footnotes omitted). A German expert in the
field has expressed the view that this statute has been successful. Reimer,
Copyright Problems of the New Audiovisual Media, 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& CoPYRiGHT L 180, 191 (1971), translated from 1973 GRUR INT'L 315.
78. Holland, supra note 14, at 126.
79. Id. The problem mentioned in note 73 supra would also exist in distributing
the proceeds of this royalty system.
80. BILBoARD, Mar. 24, 1978, at 3. The resulting increase in price to the con-
sumer of blank tapes would also serve to help increase the sales of pre-re-
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While it has been suggested that the fair use section does not
by its terms save the home recorder from infringement for the re-
cording of television broadcasts, others have stated that regardless
of this interpretation such private use is or should be a fair use8l or
alternatively, a separate "home use" exception should be judicially
recognized.82 This idea will now be examined in conjunction with
the example usually given in support of the no infringement posi-
tion, that of home recording of sound recordings for private use.
There is some oft-quoted legislative history which states that
home recording of radio broadcasts is not an infringement of the
copyright laws. The language is from the House Report on the
Sound Recordings Amendment of 1971 under a section entitled,
"Home Recording," and should be examined in full:
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings it is
the intention of this Committee that this copyright not grant any broader
rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under the existing
title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the
home recording from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded per-
formances, where the home recording is for private use and with no pur-
pose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing on it. This practice is
common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and perform-
ers would be in no different position from that of the owners of copyright
in recorded musical compositions over the past 20 years.
83
From this passage it is easy to draw the initial conclusion that
in drafting the copyright laws Congress did not intend to prohibit
home recordings of audio, or by analogy, audiovisual works. But
this is not the only possible conclusion. The Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971, like the sound recording provisions adopted
by the General Revision, expressly excluded motion pictures and
other audiovisual works from its scope. Therefore, although para-
doxical on the surface, an argument can be advanced that Con-
gress intended to allow private recordings of phonorecords and
audio broadcasts for home use, but did not intend to do the same
for audiovisual recordings of broadcasts by television stations.
There is even some validity in the reasoning behind such a distinc-
tion. The argument is made that when a song or album is recorded
and stored by the listener, and he or she hears that musical piece
again on the radio, that person will nevertheless still listen to the
song and consequently his or her act of recording will not greatly
hurt the broadcasting station or that piece of music economically
or popularly.84 However, a viewer tires much more quickly watch-
corded audiovisual works, since it would make the two products similar in
price.
81. See note 43 supra.
82. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text supra.
83. H. . REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1572 (emphasis added).
84. But see note 80 & accompanying text supra.
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ing the same thing repetitiously, the argument goes, so when the
viewer sees a program or movie that he or she has previously re-
corded and stored, that viewer will tune that program out, thereby
economically damaging both the copyright holder of the individual
movie or program, and the network which has broadcast it.
Since a major purpose of copyright law is to offer incentives to
"authors" by protecting their "writings," the above analysis dem-
onstrates that audio recording for home use does not jeopardize
that purpose, but video recording does sufficiently damage that
goal and must be prohibited. Or to state the argument in terms of
section 107(4) of the General Revision, the potential market for the
audio recording is not greatly affected by home recording so it con-
stitutes a fair use. But, as previously noted, the potential market
for VTR prerecorded software and for broadcast television pro-
grams is affected and so does not come within the fair use exclu-
sion. This view is of course speculative in that it presupposes facts
about the private consumers/users' habits which may in fact not
be totally accurate. Similarly, it ignores the fact that although ra-
dio airplay may not be negatively affected, the value of the copy-
right will be hurt by a reduction in sales of phonorecords and pre-
recorded tapes. It also assumes a rather narrow and specific divid-
ing line between fair use and infringement. Judging by past deci-
sions, the courts may not agree with these assumptions when they
decide the issue.
There are other facts about the legislative history which point
to a third possible view on the subject. Not only is the 1971 House
Report not the law, but it likely does not represent Congress' true
intent on this matter when it passed the General Revision in 1976.
First of all, similar language is not found in the Senate Report on
the Sound Recordings Amendment of 1971.85 Moreover, that spe-
cific language or any similar to it is completely absent from the
entire legislative history of the 1976 General Revision, which
superceded the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, and adopted
much of the language of the Sound Recording Act concerning this
issue. Therefore, on this basis, one could discern a Congressional
intent to withdraw from that position, which logically could show
an intent to withdraw any special exception from infringement for
either audio or visual reproduction in the home for private use.
But it is always difficult, and sometimes dangerous, to determine
what is meant by legislative silence; thus it appears that any of the
three conclusions discussed could be adopted by the courts. In
summary, these conclusions are (1) that both audio and video re-
cordings for private, noncommercial use in the home are infringe-
85. S. REP. No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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ments of the exclusive right to reproduce the work, (2) that both
uses meet the fair use or home use exception, and are allowed by
the General Revision; or (3) that audio recordings meet the fair
use, or home use exception, and VTR recordings are an infringe-
ment. The latter view seems the least likely, for if it becomes law,
the anomalous result would be that persons could record radio
broadcasts, but not television broadcasts, even if they were only
recording the sound.86
B. Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Perform the Copyrighted
Work Publicly
1. In General
In addition to the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted
work, the exclusive right to perform that work publicly must be
analyzed.
The General Revision provides in section 106(4) that the copy-
right owner has the exclusive right to perform audiovisual works
publicly.8 7 In determining the extent of this right the definitions in
section 101 again become important. "To 'perform' a work means
... in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
show its images in any sequence or to make the sound accompany-
ing it audible."88 Thus, there appears to be little doubt but that the
physical act of placing the VTR software into the unit for viewing
on the screen would be a "performance" under the definition.8 9
The question to resolve consequently becomes what constitutes
"publicly" in the context of the exclusive right to perform the work
publicly. Section 101 provides:
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a fam-
fly and its social acquaintance is gathered, or
86. This is because the sound accompanying an audiovisual work is excluded
from sound recordings and included in audiovisual works by the definitions
in the General Revision Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Another issue not ad-
dressed by the House Committee is the fact that private recording would not
only allegedly infringe the copyright in the sound recording, but the underly-
ing musical composition as well. Arguably the House Committee Report only
concerns the copyright in the sound recording, and not the underlying music.
Perhaps one would still have to pay a compulsory license to the owners of
this copyright, even if the taping of the sound recording itself was considered
fair use. But apparently, by the language of the report, it was felt neither
would be infringed.
87. See notes 37-38 & accompanying text supra.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
89. The House Committee felt this was true in the analogous area of putting a
phonorecord on an audio stereo for playing and listening. H. R. REP. No. 1476,




(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of re-
ceiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in sepa-
rate places and at the same time or at different times.
9 0
One important change section 106(4) makes in the 1909 Act is re-
moving a "for profit" limitation on the performance rights of some
copyright owners. 9 1 The distinction between nonprofit and com-
mercial was difficult to make under the 1909 Act. Additionally, the
drafters of the General Revision worried that such a limitation on
the exclusive rights "could not only hurt authors but could dry up
their incentives to write."9 2
The definition of public performance under the General Revi-
sion also cleared up several questions plaguing the old law which
were caused by some lower court interpretations of the term "pub-
lic" under the 1909 Act. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing
Corp. v. Wyatt & Maryland Yacht Club,93 the court held that
where a motion picture was shown at a social club for members
and their guests, it was not a public performance within the old
statute. The Register of Copyrights had taken exception to the
holding in this case,9 4 and the law on this subject was largely in
doubt.95 The committee reports for the General Revision made it
"clear that, contrary to the Maryland Yacht Club decision, per-
formances in 'semipublic' places such as clubs, lodges, factories,
summer camps, and schools are 'public performances' subject to
copyright control."96 Since the Act itself stated this proposition
90. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
91. A distinction in the 1909 Act was made between dramatic works, which need
not be performed for profit, and non-dramatic works, which had the for profit
requirement before infringement could be found. See § 1 of the 1909 Act. But
see 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (1976), which retains this distinction for some purposes.
92. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5676; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1975).
93. 21 Copyright Office Bull. 203 (D. Md. 1932). Compare this case, in which the
court reasoned that a private nonprofit showing was no different than in one's
own home, and Lerner v. Schectman, 228 F. Supp. 354,358 (D. Minn. 1964), in
which the court ruled that the showing in question took place at a commer-
cial club, rather than the more private club setting in the Maryland Yacht
Club case and thus was a commercial performance. Cf. Chappell & Co. v.
Middletown Farmers Market & Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1964) (find-
ing of public performance where defendants piped music through their mer-
chandise mart).
94. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 45, at 29-30.
95. On the problem of what was meant by public performance under the 1909
Act, see Meyer, supra note 13, at 30-31; Taylor, supra note 45, at 96; Comment,
supra note 6, at 694-96.
96. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5677-78.
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clearly, this explanation in the committee reporfs is probably su-
perfluous.9 7
2. Pre-recorded VTR Software
A viewer may lawfully procure pre-recorded VTR software and
still face infringement questions concerning the public perform-
ance right in the software. The similarities between this pre-re-
corded material-especially pre-recorded musical videotapes,
disks, and cassettes 9 8-and the current audio stereo market and
corresponding record and tape industry are readily apparent. Nev-
ertheless, with regard to current United States copyright law, there
is a great difference between the exclusive rights given copyright
owners of audiovisual works, and those given the copyright owners
of sound recordings. The General Revision does not significantly
limit the enumerated rights of section 106 respecting audiovisual
works, but by section 114 of the Act, a copyright owner in a sound
recording is not given the performance rights granted to other
works in section 106(4). However, there is a copyright in the under-
lying music as well as the sound recording, and there is an exclu-
sive performance right given to the owner of the copyright in the
music. Therefore, public performance of a phonorecord is an in-
fringement of the copyright in the music, although not in the copy-
right of the sound recording, something made clear by section
114(c). Judging from the similarities between audio and audiovi-
sual works, a strong argument can be made that no difference
should exist in copyright treatment of the two types of works.99 If
97. Concerning VTR use, the language in clause two of the public performance
definition appears at first glance to prohibit the unauthorized broadcasting of
pre-recorded video programs transmitted to individual viewers who are, for
instance, in hotel rooms or subscribers to a pay or cable television service.
However, the complex provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) must be consid-
ered.
Section 111(a) (1) provides:
The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a
performance... of a work is not an infringement of the copyright if-
(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a cable system, and
consists entirely of the relaying, by the management of a hotel, apart-
ment house, or similar establishment, of signals transmitted by a
broadcast station ... to the private lodgings of guests or residents of
such establishment, and no direct charge is made to see or hear the
secondary transmission.
98. With respect to pre-recorded software, disks can be included in the discus-
sion. Moreover, if they live up to their expectations of being much less ex-
pensive than the videocassettes currently being used, they may well be able
to compete on the market with other software, despite their incapability to
record television broadcasts. See note 6 supra. Here again, software means
both the tape and the copyright of the audiovisual work embodied in the tape.
See text accompanying note 7 supra.
99. For such an argument that VTR software, with respect to those works where
the music predominates, and soun.d recordings, should be given equal treat-
ment under the copyright laws, see Holland, supra note 14, at 111.
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it is assumed, arguendo, that for the sake of consistency both
sound recording and VTR software in which the music predomi-
nates should be treated identically, the problem still exists of dis-
cerning whether the video work is to be stripped of its perform-
ance rights, or the sound recording is to be afforded performing
rights.100
Of the three possible treatments of VTR systems under copy-
right law,' 0 ' however, it is not at all clear that the distinction made
between audiovisual works and sound recordings in the General
Revision is wrong. It is quite obvious from the definitions and lan-
guage used throughout the General Revision that a distinction was
expressly desired by Congress. It probably felt that attempting to
distinguish between audiovisual works which were predominantly
cinematographic works and those in which the music
predominated would be much more difficult and that perhaps the
distinction between sound recordings and audiovisual works
would at least have the advantage of easy application.
At this time it should be emphasized that this discussion only
concerns a person's exclusive right to '"publicly perform" and to
reproduce his or her copyrighted audiovisual work as it relates to a
home video user's private recording. The General Revision poten-
tially differs in its treatment of users of audiovisual works and
100. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12763 (Copyright Office recommendation to Congress that
performance rights be given sound recordings) (in accordance with 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(d) (1976)). The House has held hearings on a bill, H.R. 6063, introduced
by Rep. Danielson, which would give a performance right in sound record-
ings. 372 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at A-1 (Mar. 30, 1978). It is inter-
esting to note that earlier versions of the copyright revision contained provi-
sions establishing a performance right in sound recordings. If the prior pro-
posals for performance rights for sound recordings were to be adopted,
however, there would be the anomalous result that sound recordings and au-
diovisual works in which the music is predominant would still not have
equivalent copyright treatment under the General Revision. This is because
proposals for sound recordings contained a clause establishing a compulsory
license, something which does not now exist with respect to performance
rights in audiovisual works. For a discussion of how compulsory licensing
might be applied to audiovisual works, see Holland, supra note 14, at 119-20.
101. This division into three different theories was advanced by the Subcommittee
of the Copyright Council investigating problems associated with video sys-
tems in Japan. The following theories have been advanced.
(1) video-programs constitute cinematographic works in the
traditional copyright sense;
(2) there exist two kinds of video-programs, one constituting
cinematographic works and the other constituting audio-visual works
other than cinematographic works;
(3) video-programs constitute special works sui generis, differ-
ent from cinematographic works or phonograms.
Klaver, The Legal Problems of Video-Cassettes and Audio-Visual Discs, 23
BuL. COPYRIGiT Soc'Y 152, 156 (1976).
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other nonprivate or semipublic users, such as libraries,10 2 educa-
tional institutions,l0 3 and "jukebox" operators.1l 4
102. Section 108 is the general provision dealing with library copying. Among the
rights given a library is the limited right to reproduce a single copy of a work.
However, motion pictures and other audiovisual works not dealing with news
are expressly excluded from the section by 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (1976), making
this use by libraries more restricted than their right to photocopy. Therefore,
it appears that library audiovisual use is no greater than that allowed for the
private home user, except that the library may fare better under the balanc-
ing of the fair use factors, especially the first factor. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f) (3)
makes a special exception to allow reproduction of "a limited number of cop-
ies and exerpts by a library or archives of an audiovisual news program."
This is true only if there is no commercial purpose, the copy is available to
the public or general researchers, and there is a notice of copyright. The
sponsor of that clause of section 108 stated that
the purpose of that clause was to prevent the copyright law from pre-
cluding such operations as the Vanderbilt University Television
News Archives, which makes videotape recordings of television news
programs, prepare indexes of the contests [sic], and leases copies of
complete broadcasts or compilations of coverage of specified subjects
for limited periods upon request from scholars and researchers.
... [I]t is not intended to limit the types of programs that can be
reproduced or distributed under this clause to daily network news-
casts. Programs that would come within the scope of the clause in-
clude local, regional, or network newscasts, interviews concerning
current news events, and on-the-spot coverage of news events.
122 CONG. REc. S17252 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Baker).
103. The video technology has been hailed for the advancement possibilities it of-
fers to the educational and research fields. See, e.g., Klaver supra note 101, at
175-76, 185; Reimer, supra note 77, at 191-93; Taylor, supra note 45, at 90. Lim-
its for educational uses are provided for in section 110, and they generally
favor nonprofit educational establishments. The instructors or pupils, in a
face-to-face teaching activity, may perform the copyrighted motion picture or
other audiovisual work. At first glance, this would appear to give the educa-
tional institution much greater rights through section 110 than it would get
under the fair use provision. However, this is a limitation on the performance
right only, and does not apply to the recording right. In fact section 110(1)
states that such use will be an infringement if "in the case of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, the performance... is given by means of a copy
that was not lawfully made under this title, and that the person responsible
for the performance knew or had reason to believe the copy was not lawfully
made." This use will avoid the "semi-public" performance problem involving
lawfully obtained software. See notes 92-96 supra. However, if the program
was taped from a network broadcast, whether or not that activity is an in-
fringement will be determined by an application of fair use standards. Again,
the fact that it is a nonprofit educational use may give it a better chance of
meeting this criteria than simple home use. However, that educational use
alone is not sufficient is seen in the recent case of Encyclopedia Britannica
Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), though the
copying there was done on a massive scale. See notes 60-65 & accompanying
text supra.
For a detailed discussion of the face-to-face teaching issues involved in
the General Revision, see Billings, Off-the-Air Videorecordizg, Face-to-Face
Teaching, and the 1976 Copyright Act, 4 N. KY. L REv. 225 (1977).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976) establishes limitations on the exclusive right to perform
nondramatic musical works through a coin-operated phonorecord player. It
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER IN VIDEO MATERIAL
A very important principle of copyright law is that ownership of
the material object, here the software, is completely different than
ownership of the copyright itself, which goes only to the intellec-
tual content. This principle is found in the General Revision at
section 202.105 In fact, this section creates the presumption that in
a transfer of the material object, the copyright itself is not trans-
ferred. This is accomplished by establishing that a conveyance of
the copyright must be made in writing. This principle is important
to keep in mind as section 109 of the General Revision 106 is ex-
amined with regard to its application to VTR systems. Considering
the dangers that exist for the copyright owner in today's mass
copying situation, a basic premise must be that the copyright own-
er will try to keep as much control over the eventual use of the
VTR software as is possible. In the case of pre-recorded software,
any wholesaler or retailer who lawfully purchases the software has
the right to dispose of it by sale, rental or any other means, accord-
ing to section 109(a). This is allowed despite the fact that the copy-
right stays with the original holder.107 This would allow retailers,
for example, to set up leasing libraries or similar operations which
might prohibit the original copyright owner from obtaining all the
profit he or she otherwise could have obtained.108 One possible so-
sets up a compulsory license system for 'jukebox" operators, who, by paying
a prescribed royalty to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, have the right to play
or "perform" the copyrighted works in coin-operated phonorecord players in
public places. If coin-operated VTR systems were to become a possibility,
the exact same use would constitute infringement. This is because of the
definition of "phonorecord," which specifically excludes audiovisual works.
See id. § 101. Therefore, a proprietor or operator of any coin-operated VTR
would have to search out all the copyright holders of each video performance,
and personally try to make licensing agreements with those people. Such a
procedure would make the growth of this video use highly impracticable. It is
another area where arguably musical video programs and sound recordings
should be treated consistently under the copyright laws. See note 99 & ac-
companying text supra.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
106. Id. § 109.
107. Note that section 109 does not allow the lawful owner of the work to publicly
perform the audiovisual work, however.
108. For example, suppose a movie, which is sold to a "video" retail shop for, say
$25, is then rented out by that retailer for $3 for a 24-hour period. If the de-
mand is high for that movie, the retailer could make $90 on the video in a
month, and still own the software. The original owner of the copyrighted
software is in the position of making only a set fee for his software, no matter
how often it is seen. That person's only control over how many people do see
the film for that original sales figure is the limitation of public performance.
Even if he or she tries to contractually alleviate this problem, section 109(a)
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lution would be for the copyright owner not to sell his or her
software to the retailer, but rather to lease it to the retailer. Under
section 109(c), this would give the retailer no right to rent or sell
the software other than with the owner's consent, similar to the
manner in which motion picture companies currently lease their
films to theaters. This would make it much easier for the copyright
owner to establish guidelines and set the prices at which he or she
would allow the leasing retailer to further rent, sell or otherwise
dispose of the software. l0 9 However, such a rental operation would
run the risk of violating the anti-trust laws.110
Related to the above discussion are a group of mixed copyright
and contractual problems which occur with the advent of any new
technology. These questions include whether audiovisual rights
belong with prior licenses and other contractual agreements for
motion pictures rights, or instead with licenses for television
rights, or neither. Or if they are works in which the music predom-
inates, perhaps the rights belong with the license for sound record-
ings. These issues are not unlike those which existed when silent
movies became "talkies," or when motion pictures came to televi-
sion, or many other similar changes of technology. As this topic
has been extensively discussed elsewhere,"' nothing more will be
detailed here other than to emphasize that the problem exists and
must be dealt with carefully through the drafting of contracts. The
problem is further complicated by the fact that the terms used in
the industry, such as VTR, video, videocassette, cartridge televi-
sion, disk television and countless others, are not consistent with
the wording in the copyright statute. 112
puts the copyright owner in a disadvantageous position. See generally Nim-
mer, supra note 51, at 11.
109. It has even been suggested that to control the number of performances possi-
ble during each individual lease to a private user, cassettes or cartridges be
developed which do not have a rewind feature, and hence can be played only
once before needing to be returned to the distributor for rewinding. Nimmer
supra note 51, at 10. Whether this would create less demand for rentals and
therefore be financially worse for the copyright owner is arguable, but such
features would certainly make sales to the ultimate consumer unattractive.
110. See Comment, supra note 6, at 698-99.
111. See, e.g., de Freitas, Audio Visual Systems, 18 Bum. CoPYRIGHT Soc'y 304,
310-11 (1971); Harris & Mirisch, Video Cassettes and the Law, 4 BEY. HIS
B.J. 16 (Summer 1970); Holland, supra note 14, at 136; Meyers, supra note 13,
at 39-41; Nimmer, supra note 51, at 12-17.
112. See Collyer, Motion Pictures and Television Under the New Copyright
Statute, in PRACTICNG UNDER THE COPYR GHT LAW OF 1976, 151, 163-64 (PLI
1977). See also Weisbond, Motion Pictures, Television Programs and Other
Audio Visual Works Under the Copyright Law, in CURRENT DECISIONs IN




The remedies available to the copyright owner for infringement
of the copyrighted video work should be briefly mentioned. The
alleged home use infringements could result in civil actions, the
remedies for which are contained in sections 502 to 505 of the Gen-
eral Revision." 3 The statute provides, as one might imagine, for
both injunctive relief, and actual damages to the copyright owner,
plus additional profits made by the infringer. Additionally, there
are provisions providing for impoundment of illegal copies, and if
the owner is successful at trial, for the eventual destruction of
those copies. Discretion is also given to the judge to award costs
and attorneys' fees to either party." 4 But none of these provisions
should concern the private VTR recorder and possible infringer,
nor are the criminal penalties of the section likely applicable to
him or her." 5 The real danger the alleged home infringer might
face is section 504(c) which allows for statutory damages instead
of actual damages. The section provides that statutory damages
are a minimum of $250 and a maximum of $10,000, as the court con-
siders just. Statutory damages are available for each individual
work that is infringed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the type of VTR recording described in this
comment is eventually considered to be an infringement of the
copyrighted work is an issue much in doubt. What is likely is that
the various recording practices of home recorders are likely to
grow as the price of VTR systems declines, 116 and as a result, noth-
ing short of injunctive relief calling for a withdrawal of the units
from the market, or technological changes," 7 is going to stop the
growing videotaping by the American public. There are two major
public interests which should be preserved as the industry, the
courts, and Congress grapple for a resolution to this issue. The
first is that of the private American to be secure in the privacy of
his or her home, and to be allowed to take advantage of a tremen-
dous, revolutionary new industry. The second goal is the basic
foundation of all copyright law, that of securing to "authors," in the
constitutional sense, financial incentive through exclusive rights in
113. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505 (1976).
114. Id. § 505.
115. See id. § 506 (stating the requirement that the copyright must be infringed
"willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage").
116. Executives at Sony have stated that prices for VTR machines with recording
and playback capabilities should eventually stabilize at around $600 to $700.
Fong-Torres, supra note 10, at 61.
117. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
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their work. Unfortunately, there has been little legislative interest
in the United States for enacting the proper laws to help alleviate
the problem,118 and it is unlikely that the industries involved will
get together and establish licensing agreements privately, in which
the VTR manufacturers would pass on this cost to their appropri-
ate consumers. 119 It is hoped the problem involving home vide-
otaping for private, noncommercial use is speedily resolved, so
that attention can be directed to the criminal violation in this area,
that of record and videotape piracy for great commercial gain.120
Charles L. Finke '79
118. See notes 76-80 & accompanying text supra.
119. No one could be expected to pay a fee until it was clearly established what
the current statute means with respect to these issues.
120. See, e.g., Bui-BoARD, Mar. 18, 1978, at 3 (reports that authorities have found
$150 million of illegal duplicating and pressing machines, and destroyed 2.2
million bootleg 8-track tapes worth $1.3 million, and 40,000 reels of film and/or
videotapes).
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